It’s not clear why, but the first server the attackers compromised was not encrypted with ransomware. In this article, we will look at some of the tools used by the attackers. :ps:pwd:staged*:stashes:suho:test:time *:ubash:ubashall:gitinfo* 'Įxport HISTTIMEFORMAT= '+%Y-%m-%d.This is a follow up to my previous article in which we looked at Ransomware attack.

# History / terminal options #Įxport HISTCONTROL=ignoredups:erasedups # no duplicate entriesĮxport HISTSIZE=100000 # 100k lines of historyĮxport HISTFILESIZE=100000 # 100kb max history sizeĮxport HISTIGNORE= ' *:* -version:changed*:clear:countsize:df:f:find:gd:gds:gl:gla:graph:graphall:gs:h:h *:history:la:ls:mc:open. $basherk_src # source basherk 'Įcho -e ' $basherk_install_string ' > ~/.bashrc ] & basherk_install_string= ' 'īasherk_install_string+= '. # add preceeding newline if bashrc already exists If ] thenĮcho 'basherk $basherk_ver (modified $(stat -f '%Sm ' -t '%a %e %b %r ' ' $basherk_src ' ), ' $(( $(date +%s) - $(stat -f %c ' $basherk_src') )) 'seconds ago) 'Įcho 'basherk $basherk_ver (modified $(date '+%a %e %b %r ' -r ' $basherk_src ' ), ' $(( $(date +%s) - $(date +%s -r ' $basherk_src') )) 'seconds ago) 'Įcho 'basherk $basherk_ver ( $basherk_date) ' # show basherk version (including time since modified if bleeding-edge) on execution ] & basherk_re_sourcing=trueīasherk_dir= $(dirname ' $basherk_src ' ) # if version is already set, we are re-sourcing basherk # If not running interactively, don't do anything # shellcheck disable=SC2120 # not a regular script, functions define arguments we won't use here

# shellcheck disable=SC2119 # not a regular script, function's $1 is never script's $1 # shellcheck disable=SC1090 # ignore non-constant source location warning

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